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Estimating Representation and Bias in 
State Legislative Redistricting 
ROBERT X. BROWNING and GARY KING* 
The Davis v. Bandemer case focused  much attention on theproblem of using 
statistical evidence to demonstrate the existence of political gerrymandering. 
In this paper,  we evaluate the uses and  limitations of measures of the seat- 
votes relationship in the Bandemer  case.  We outline a statktical method we 
have  developed  that  can  be  used  to  estimate  bias  and  the form  of 
representation in legislative redistricting.  We apply this method to Indiana 
state House and Senate elections for the period 1972 to 1984 and demonstrate 
a maximum bias of 6.2% toward the Republicans in the House and a 2.8% 
bias in the Senate. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In an important case decided in 1986, the U.S.  Supreme Court held for the 
first time that the long-standing practice of political gerrymandering was 
justiciable  (Davis  v.  Bandemer,  106  S.Ct.  2797  (1986)).  Undoubtedly 
because the justices understood full well that they were venturing into the 
"political thicket" of which Justice Frankfurter had once warned, the Court 
in the same decision ruled that the appellees, the Indiana Democrats, had 
not met the threshold necessary to prove that gerrymandering had occurred. 
In  this  case  and  in  the  California  case  that  almost  surely will  follow 
(Badham v.  Eu), the courts are increasingly asked to consider statistical 
evidence purporting to show that a political party is, through the gerry- 
mander, unfairly disadvantaged in its ability to translate citizen votes into 
legislative seats. 
In  this paper,  our goal is in  part to assist the courts in  their quest to 
understand "which statistician is more credible or less credible" (Bandemer 
v. Davis (603 F.  Supp.  1479, 1485) (S.D.  Ind. 1984)) and to provide some 
help in understanding the limits of seats-votes  relationships as indicators of 
political discrimination.  In  the sections that  follow we  outline the legal 
background  to  gerrymandering  cases  and  evaluate  the  statistical 
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requirements and problems presented  by  the recent  Indiana redistricting 
case. 
A statistical model we have developed (King and Browning, 1987) is used 
to point out problematic aspects of past research. This model can provide 
statistically  reliable  estimates  of  both  partisan  bias  and  the  form  of 
democratic  representation.  We  outline  this  model  and apply it  to the 
historical  seats-votes  data  for the  Indiana  state  Senate  and  House  of 
Representatives.  Finally,  we conclude by stressing the implications of the 
use of seats-votes  relationships for future court cases. 
11.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Prior to the Bandemer Supreme Court decision,  partisan political gerry- 
mandering  was  not  considered  justiciable  (Dixon,  1971:  32;  see  also, 
Grofman et al., 1982).' In this decision, the first argued in the term and one 
of the last to  be decided, the Justices were sharply divided into three groups: 
Those who believed that the issue was justiciable,  but not proven in this 
case; those who believed that it was justiciable and demonstrated; and those 
who thought it was not justiciable. The majority opinion (written by Justice 
White and joined  by Justices Brennan, Marshall,  Blackmun, Powell,  and 
Stevens) held that gerrymandering was a justiciable controversy rather than 
a  "nonjusticiable  political  question."  On the  question  of  whether  the 
appellees, the Indiana Democrats, had met the threshold in proving a denial 
of equal protection, this group of justices split. A plurality of four (White 
joined  by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun) ruled that the threshold had 
not been met. Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented from this 
view and argued that the threshold had been met. In an opinion concurring 
only in the result, Justice O'Connor Goined by  Chief Justice Burger and 
Justice Rehnquist) argued strongly against the justiciability  of this issue: 
"The step taken today is a momentous one, that if followed in the future 
can only lead to political  instability  and judicial  malaise . . . The Equal 
Protection  Clause  does  not  supply judicially  manageable  standards  for 
resolving purely political gerrymandering claims, and no group right to an 
equal share of political  power  was ever intended  by  the Framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment" (106 S.Ct.  2797, 2818 (1986)). 
The impact of this decision is to allow other cases alleging political gerry- 
mandering  to proceed  through the courts.  The most notable is  the case 
challenging the California congressional redistricting, Badham  v.  Eu  (see 
Grofman, 1985b), that essentially has been on hold since the appeal in the 
Indiana  Bandemer  decision  was  accepted  by  the  high  court.2 Barring 
changes in the Court or positions of the justices,  the decisions in future 
cases will rest on the ability of the plaintiffs to prove that they have met the 
threshold test. The question that we address is the appropriateness of seats- 
votes statistics in establishing the required threshold. 
; 
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Much attention in the Bandemer debate focused on a single statistic cited 
by  the majority in the district court decision,  the difference between the 
percentage of statewide votes received by the democrats and the percentage 
of seats won in the legislature: 
Most significant among these many statistical figures is the fact that in  1982 
Democratic candidates for the Indiana House earned 5  1.9 percent of all votes 
cast across the state. However only 43  [of  1001  Democrats were elected to 
seats. The State argues that it is possible that this disparity is explained by the 
Republicans fielding better candidates or other factors that make the outcome 
of  such elections sensitive to the interests of the voters and the issues of  the 
day.  The Court  would  readily  concede this  possibility,  but  the  disparity 
between the percentage of votes and the number of seats won is, at the very 
least, a signal that Democrats may have been  unfairly disadvantaged by  the 
districting (603 F.  Supp. at 1485). 
In his dissenting opinion in the district court case, Judge Pel1 took issue with 
this statistic. Grofman, an expert witness for the Republicans in the Indiana 
case, was  also critical  of the district  court's  reliance  on the seats-votes 
statistic: 
I feel  obligated to mention  my  own  worst  fear,  namely, that even  though 
statistical methods to detect gerrymandering do exist, courts will be unable to 
grasp the sophisticated nuances of seatshotes relationships and the need for 
multifaceted tests. . . .  the Bandemer majority opinion is my  fear come to life: 
It oversimplifies the relationship between the existence of seatshotes discrep- 
ancies and evidence of  political gerrymandering (Grofman. 1985a: 159). 
The Supreme Court plurality also took issue with the statistic: 
Relying on a single election to prove unconstitutional discrimination is unsatis- 
factory. The District Court observed, and the parties do not disagree, that 
Indiana is a swing State. Voters sometimes prefer Democratic candidates, and 
sometimes Republican. . . .  The District Court did not ask by what percentage 
the statewide Democratic vote would have had to increase to control either the 
House or the Senate. The appellants argue here, without a persuasive response 
from appellees, that had the Democratic candidates received an additional few 
percentage points of  the votes cast statewide, they would  have obtained a 
majority of  the seats in both houses. Nor was there any finding that the 1981 
reapportionment would  consign the Democrats to a minority  status in  the 
Assembly throughout the 1980's or that the Democrats would have no hope of 
doing  any  better  in  the reapportionment  that would  occur  after the  1990 
census. Without findings of this nature, the District Court erred in concluding 
that the 1981 Act violated the Equal Protection Clause (106 S.Ct.  at 2812). 
Given these facts and findings of the Court, a more complete evaluation of 
the  seats-votes  relationship  and its  appropriateness  as  an indicator  of 
political gerrymandering is needed. 
111.  EVALUATING THE EVIDENCE IN BANDEMER 
Previous analyses have focused almost exclusively on data from only one 
election  year  to assess  partisan  bias  in  legislative  redistricting.  In this 308  LA W & POLICY  July 1987 
section, we  make two points about this commonplace practice.  First, we 
show that previous methods of analyzing one year are flawed. Second, we 
argue that even a correct analysis of one election year is inadequate to assess 
bias. The reason is that what appears as partisan bias may be bias, or it just 
may  reflect  a  different  system  of  fair  representation.  With  existing 
statistical methods and models, results from multiple elections are needed to 
distinguish these two essential components. 
In his dissent in the Bandemer district court decision, Judge Pel1 argued 
that the majority's method of analyzing the single year seats-votes  relation- 
ship was inadequate. Along with Justicce Stevens in Karcher v.  Daggett (462 
U.S.  725 (1983)), Pell favored the use of a method proposed by Backstrom, 
Robins and Eller (1978) in which 
. . .  these authors suggest isolating "typical" statewide races, those concerning 
"relatively invisible offices," and determining the percentage of votes cast for 
each  candidate  in  these  races.  Id.  at  1131.  These  "typical"  races  more 
accurately reflect partisan voting strength because  their outcome depends, 
more  often  than  not,  on  straight  party  affiliation  rather  than  on  the 
personalities of the particular candidates. Id. (603 F.  Supp. at  1501). 
Unfortunately,  as Niemi  (1985:  206-207)  correctly  points  out (see  also, 
Grofman, 1985a: 121), Pell misapplies this methodology to Indiana. Rather 
than averaging a statewide base vote for 1980 and 1982 (46.8% Democratic) 
and comparing it to the 1982 Democratic House seats won (43%) and the 
Senate seats (52%), he should have calculated the number  of legislative 
seats that would have been won if this ".normal"  vote were cast in the 77 
legislative  districts.  Neither  Niemi  nor  Pel1  carry  out  this  calculation, 
presumably because of  the enormity of  the task.  The data must  first be 
collected for the 4755 precincts and then aggregated within district lines into 
the 77 single and multi-member  1982 legislative districts. This aggregation 
produces the partisari balance in the simulated legislative election. 
We  have  calculated  this  statistic  for  the  1982 ~ndiana  House  races. 
Averaging the statewide vote for two minor state offices, the auditor and 
clerk  of the courts, we  find that the statewide "normal  vote"  is 49.8% 
Dem~cratic.~  When aggregated into 1982 legislative districts,  we  find that 
the Democrats would win 3 1 (40.2%) of 77 districts based on this "normal" 
vote.  Since sixteen of these districts are double or triple member districts, 
this  translates  into  38  (38%)  Democratic members  in  the  100 member 
H~use.~  Whereas  Judge  Pell  calculated  that  the  46.8%  Democratic 
"normal"  vote would have elected 43 House members, we calculate that a 
49.8%  "normal"  vote would have elected only 38 House members. Rather 
than the 3.8% difference he finds, we find an 11.8% difference, even larger 
than the 8.9% difference between the actual 51.9% of the votes and the 43 
seats won. 
Although the Supreme Court speculated about whether the 1982 election 
was atypical, the direct result of the 1981 redistricting, or simply a typical 
off-year  election  in  Indiana,  little  attention  was  given  to  additional 
~.:~+-..:.~i  ,I,.-  T. ..-..--  I..  .I:.  .... .I.I ....  n  .  .  C  7 
Browning and King  SEA TS, VOTES, AND GERR YMANDERZNG  309 
1972 to  1984 seats  and votes  for  the  Indiana  House and  Senate  were 
aggregated and are displayed in Table 1. As with other state legislatures 
(Campbell, 1986), the data in this table indicate that presidential election 
years swing with, and mid-term elections swing away from, the incumbent 
president. The 1982 seats-votes  discrepancy falls below the 1974 and 1978 
figures  for  both  the  House  and  the  Senate.  The Democratic  vote  for 
Secretary of  State in  the off-year elections of  1974, 1978, and  1982 was 
53.5%, 44.3%,  and 48.1 %,  respectively.  Judging from these figures, we 
- pppppp 
might expect the seats-votes  discrepancy for 1982 to fall between those of 
1974 and 1978, instead of below them. The Senate shows the same trend as 
the House except that the off-year elections have been more favorable for 
the Democrats in the Senate than in the House. 
Table 1.  Indiana Democratic Seats and Votes,  1972-1984 
House  Senate 
Year  Votes  Seats  Districts  Votes  Seats  Districts 
1984  44.0%  39.0%  100  42.3%  28.0%  25 
1982  51.8%  43.0%  100  53.1%  52.0%  25 
1980  46.9%  37.0%  100  43.6%  20.0%  25 
1978  50.2%  46.0%  100  50.5%  60.0%  25 
1976  51.9%  48.0%  100  50.0%  44.0%  25 
1974  54.0%  55.0%  100  56.6%  68.0%  25 
1972  44.5%  27.0%  100  41.5%  24.0%  25 
Source: Calculated by the authors from Election Reports: State of Indiana, annual volumes. 
Thus, certain things can be learned by concentrating on a single election 
year. In so doing, we must also remember that it is exceedingly hazardous 
for any method  to extrapolate from one election year  to many.  It thus 
becomes  more important to focus on methods that utilize more that one 
datum. This latter argument was lost in much social science literature and 
legal argument. 
The reliance on a single year to prove political discrimination has been 
criticized in both the dissent district court decision and the Supreme Court 
decisions in the Bandemer case. In a recent exposition of different methods 
of  calculating  seats-votes  relationships, two social  scientists  (Niemi and 
Fett, 1986) argue that using two years of data is insufficient, more than two 
years is better, but that their single-year "hypothetical"  measure is best. We 
are not persuaded by this method that essentially extrapolates the aggregate 
seats-votes  ratio plus or minus five percentage points and then uses these 
eleven  points  in  a  linear  regression.  This  "hypothetical"  seats-votes 
relationship is then used to project seats for all other possible percentages of 
votes. We argue that this method places too much emphasis on only one 
data point-the  percentage of seats and votes for a single year for the nation 
or a state-and  makes the assumption that a change in the statewide vote 
affects each district equally. We agree with the Court majority in Bandemer 310  LA W 8 POLICY  July I987 
that "Relying on a single election to prove unconstitutional discrimination 
is unsatisfactory."  (106 S.Ct. at 2812). 
An  example from another analysis of  the seats-votes  relationship  for 
Indiana illustrates the confusion  that  often surrounds these discussions. 
Niemi  (1985), using  the methodology outlined in Niemi  and Fett  (1986), 
calculates a "swing  ratio"  of 1.48 for the Indiana House in 1982. Niemi 
(1985:  198) explains that, 
A swing ratio of 1.48 means that for every  1% gain in  votes, the Democrats 
would have gained an average of  1.5% more seats. Or, to put it in'terms of the 
task that the Democrats faced, if they had gained 5% more of the vote, they 
could have expected to gain 7.4% more seats (for a total of  50.4% of the seats 
with 57.9% of  the vote). 
This  1.48  swing  ratio  is  estimated  from  one  observed  point  and  10 
extrapolated points over the approximately straight part of the seats-votes 
curve between 45% and 55% Democratic vote. It further assumes that there 
is a uniform partisan effect across all districts in the state. It considers the 
effects of bias in a very limited range around 50% and does not distinguish 
bias from the slope of the curve. Again, confusing proportionality with bias, 
Niemi (1985: 200) states,  "It  also treated the Democrats and Republicans 
quite differently, inasmuch as the Republicans could have expected to win 
nearly 63% of the seats if they had won 51.9% of the vote."  The pictorial 
representation of the seats-votes relationship drawn by Niemi shows an even 
steeper curve than  we  obtain for Indiana and certainly reveals a steeper 
slope than  1.48.  Since the  1.48  "swing  ratio"  is estimated over a limited 
range of values, it cannot be a very precise measure of the Indiana seats- 
votes relationship. 
An analogy will help to clarify this point. Consider the task of drawing a 
line with a ruler.  If there is only one point on the page,  then an infinite 
number of lines can be drawn through this point. More information or extra 
assumptions are needed to determine where the ruler should stop pivoting. 
If there are two points on the page, then there is just enough information to 
draw the line. Suppose, however, there were sampling or measurement error 
when  the points  were  plotted.  In  this  case,  two  points  will  provide  an 
approximation, but a better solution would to be plot as many points as are 
available. The ruler is then used to draw a line that is most nearly in the 
middle of the points. The positive and negative errors will likely cancel out, 
resulting in  the best  possible line. This analogy applies directly to most 
statistical  analyses.  Since  the  social  and  political  world  is  necessarily 
measured  with  error, we  should  strive  for more  accurate  estimates  by 
increasing the number of observations. Certainly, when more observations 
are available, they should be exploited. 
Focusing on a single year, or even casual interpretation of the series in 
Table 1, is insufficient to understand  the relationship between seats and 
votes.  Rather,  what is needed is a method  that is  designed to take into 
account multiple election years. In the following two sections we present a 
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method that embodies the two essential components of American republican 
democracy. We first distinguish between several forms of fair representation. 
Although many scholars have considered only proportional representation 
to be fair, the Court in Bandemer now recognizes that there can be other 
fair systems. We provide a model and an explication of these other forms of 
representation.  The succeeding section introduces a measure of bias that 
interacts  with the form of  representation.  Taken together,  the next two 
sections provide a sophisticated model encompassing the form of represen-  -  -  -  ---  pp 
tation and degree of partisan bias experienced in American legislatures5. 
IV.  REPRESENTATION 
Scholars of  different  disciplines have sought to measure the relationship 
between seats and votes since at least 1909 (Kendall and Stuart, 1950). Some 
believe that this relationship may be described by the cube law, that has the 
general form: 
where S = proportion of seats for one party and V  = the proportion of 
votes for that  party.  1-S  and  1-V  measure the proportion of  seats and 
votes, respectively, for the other party. The cube law is a special case of (1) 
in  which p =  3. Thus, in a two party single member district election, the 
ratio of the proportion of seats of one party to the proportion of seats of the 
other party is equal to the cube (p=3) of the proportion of votes of one 
party to the proportion of seats of the other party. Allowing p to take on 
values other than three resulted in a relationship that held quite well across a 
number of electoral systems and years (Tufte, 1973; Taagepera,  1973; and 
the  citations  in  Grofman,  1983:  317).  The evidence and the  nature  of 
political  relationships  would  support  our  view  that  the  relationship  is 
probabilistic, rather than deterministic (King and Browning, 1987; Schrodt, 
1981: 33). 
The cube  law  is  but  one  form  of  representation  found  in  American 
legislative systems. While p  may vary from 1 to oo, we  will depict three 
examples in Figure 1. This figure plots the relationship expressed mathemat- 
ically in equation 1. Table 2 shows these possible values for and interpre- 
tations of p  that summarize the different types of representation that are 
graphically displayed in Figure 1. The "S"  or "escalator"-shaped curve is 
the  case of  majoritarian  representation.  The broken line is  the case of 
winner-take-all-moving  past the 50% vote mark allocates all the seats to 
one  party.  The  45  degree  line  is  the  case  of  p =  1,  or  proportional 
representation.  All  of  these  lines  refer  to different  types  of  unbiased 
representation systems. 
Proportional representation means that each percentage increase in votes 
translates  into an equal percentage increase in seats.  If  representation in r 312  LA W & POLICY  July 1987 
Figure 1.  Forms of Unbiased Representation 
Proportion Democratic  Votes 
NOTE:  Lines are drawn based on Equation 1. 
Table 2. Representation Coefficient Values 
Coefficient  Representation type 
p=a,  winner-take-all 
w>p>l  majoritarian 
p = 1  proportional 
American  legislatures were allocated  according to a strictly proportional 
rule, one could expect a party to win 55% of the seats by winning 55% of 
the vote,  for example. Many have mistakenly used proportionality as the 
standard to evaluate fairness. Dixon (1971: 13) characterizes this dilemma: 
"A paradox of the one man, one vote, revolution is that we now perceive 
our goal to be something approaching a proportional result,  in terms of 
group access to the legislative process, while retaining the district method of 
election."  The Bandemer majority spoke clearly on this point:  "Our cases, 
however,  clearly  foreclose  any  claim  that  the  Constitution  requires 
proportional  representation  or that  legislatures  in  reapportioning  must 
draw district lines to come as near  as possible  to allocating seats to the 
contending parties in proportion to what their anticipated  statewide vote 
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will be.  Whitcomb v. Chavis, 402 U.S.,  at 153, 146, 160; White v. Regester, 
412 U.S.,  at 765-766"  (106 S.Ct at 2809). 
A second type of representation depicted in Figure 1 is winner-take-all, 
where p in equation 1 is equal to infinity. Here 50% plus one vote results in 
100% of the seats. As p approaches infinity the party with less than 50% 
plus one vote gets no seats and the "winner takes all."  When there is only 
one district and one member, we use winner-take-all. Small states with one 
representative,  such as Wyoming  and Alaska,  are winner-take-all  states. 
The election of the president is a case of winner-take-all representation. In 
the United States, we use winner-take-all representation on a district and 
state basis for the House of Representatives and the Senate respectively. For 
state legislatures,  the use of large multi-member  districts  are effectively 
winner-take-all. For example, in the late 1960s fifteen members were elected 
to  the Indiana House at-large from Marion County (Indianapolis). This point 
was noted in Whitcomb v. Chavis (402 U.S.  124 (1971)) in which the country- 
wide multi-member districts were upheld by the Supreme Court. 
A striking but typical example of the importance of  party affiliation and the 
"winner  take  all"  effect  is  shown  by  the  1964  House  of  Representatives 
election. [Figures omitted here.] Though nearly 300,000 Marion County voters 
cast nearly 4% million votes for the House, the high and low candidates within 
each party varied by  only about a thousand votes. And, as these figures show, 
the Republicans lost  every  seat  though they  received  48.69%  of  the vote. 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 10.  Whitcomb v. Chavis (402 U.S. 124 at 133-34  n.  11). 
The final form of representation displayed in Figure 1 is majoritarian. 
Represented by the steep "escalator"-shaped  curve, where p =  3, it reflects 
an important principle of the United States two-party,  democratic system. 
It helps  majorities  form, yet  protects  the minority party.  Once a party 
approaches the 50% point, it easily gains additional seats helping it form a 
governing,  legislative  majority.  Others  have  termed  this  the  "balloon 
effect"  (See Backstrom et al.,  1978:  1134 and Grofman, 1985a: 159; see 
Niemi, 1985). It is difficult, however, for one party to gain all the seats and 
deprive the minority of representation. This can be seen in how the curve 
flattens out as it moves towards the ends of the distribution. As p increases 
from one to a,  the seats-votes  curve steepens near the middle and flattens 
out near the ends, indicating that the party is winning more seats than its 
proportionate share of votes in the middle range and less seats towards the 
ends. 
Others  (Tufte,  1973;  Niemi  and  Fett,  1986)  have  represented  this 
majoritarian curve as a straight line since most of the points fall in the 
central portion that does appear relatively straight. This simplification has 
also been justified because the linear form is easier to comprehend than the 
non-linear,  cube form. However,  the linear  form neglects the important 
information we gain from observing the flatness at the extremes and the 
variation in state electoral systems that gives rise to a variety of shapes and 
values of p. Any effort to interpret seats-votes  relationships as indicators of 314  LAW & POLICY  July 1987 
political gerrymandering must consider the historical nature of the particular 
state in question. As Justice O'Connor wrote in her concurring opinion in 
Bandemer, "Redistricting itself represents a middle ground between winner- 
take-all  statewide elections and proportional  representation  for political 
parties" (106 S.Ct. at 2824). Our model estimates redistricting in this middle 
ground rather than suggesting as O'Connor  feared "that  the greater the 
departure from proportionality,  the more suspect an apportionment plan 
becomes."  (106 S.Ct. at 2824). 
All  of  these  three  types  are  fair  representation  because  of  partisan 
symmetry; that is, they treat each party equally. The seats-votes  curves of 
Figure 1 are symmetric and thus evidence no bias. The "escalator" curve is 
symmetrical about 50% indicating that each party is treated the same and 
that  parties  are  assisted  in  their  effort  to  achieve  a  majority  as  the 
percentage of  their  votes  nears  50%.  While  the  "balloon"  effect helps 
majorities form and protects minorities, it is fair because the other party 
would experience the same effect if  it were to achieve a majority. 
Others have described this effect as bias. See, for example, Backstrom et 
al.'s  (1978:  1134) comment that "The balloon effect has been demonstrated 
empirically. Because the percentage of districts won by the dominant party 
tends to be higher than its percentage of the statewide popular vote, Dixon 
11968: 50-541  has observed that single-member districting creates at least a 
mild bias in favor of the dominant party."  Niemi (1985) also referred to the 
steepness of the "escalator" curve as indicating bias. Even the district court 
in Bandemer referred to the single seats-votes  statistic as evidence of  "the 
suspicion of this  kind  of  built-in  bias."  (603  F.  Supp.  at  1486).  Our 
objections to these statements is, in part, definitional. The word "bias" has 
been used to mean very different things. We use the term "bias" to indicate 
deviations from partisan symmetry. Nevertheless, the concepts of invidious 
partisan bias and different fair systems of democratic representation remain 
confused in court opinions and scholarly analyses. 
V.  BIAS 
h  a  model  we  develop elsewhere (King and Browning,  1987) we  add a 
parameter to the general form of the seats-votes relationship in equation 1. 
This parameter, P,  Equation 2  is  included to allow for bias  defined as 
partisan asymmetry. Its effect is to cause the lines in Figure 1 to shift to the 
right or to the left. If the lines do not pass through the intersection of 50% 
votes and 50%  seats, the form of representation  is biased. A party could 
thus achieve a lesiglative majority by gaining less than 50%  of the votes. 
The effect of bias on the basic forms of representation are shown in Figures 
2 and 3. 
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Figure 2.  Bias and Proportional Representation 
0  .5  .o 
Proportion Democratic Votes 
NOTES:  Lines are drawn based on Equation 2 
Representation  is  the steepness or  flatness of  the curve, whereas bias 
measures the extent to which the seats-votes  relationship favors one party 
or the other. Figures 2 and 3 show that the effect of bias varies depending 
on where one is on the curve. With proportional representation (in Figure 
2),  one can  readily see that  difference between the curves varies as one 
moves  away  from  50%.  The lower  curve,  where  ln(P)= -  1, is  biased 
toward the Republicans; the upper curve, where In@) = 1, is biased toward 
the Democrats. On the lower curve, the Democrats need almost 75% of the 
vote to win a legislative majority. On the upper curve, they need only 27%. 
The forms of majoritarian representation displayed in Figure 3 also show 
the differential  effects of  bias.  Here,  in the lower curve, that is  biased 
toward  the Republicans, the Democrats need  60%  of the vote to win  a 
majority while the Democrats require only 40%.  The upper curve, biased 
toward  the Democrats,  shows the exact opposite effect. In the unbiased 
line,  50%  votes  yields  50%  seats.  In  the  curve  biased  toward  the 
Republicans, 50%  votes yields only 27%  of  the seats for the Democrats; 
58% of the votes are necessary for the Democrats to win 50% of the seats. 
Bias, therefore, must be evaluated relative to the form of representation 
and the percentage of votes received. In the proportional case depicted in 
Figure 2, the area between the 45  degree proportional line and the curved 
line is  the total bias  for all  possible  vote outcomes under this type  of 3 16  LA W & POLICY  July 1987 
Figure 3.  Bias and Majoritarian Representation (p  =  3) 
Proportion Democratic  Votes 
NOTE: Lines are drawnn based on Equation 2. 
represetltation.  This is  equivalent to a  Lorenz curve commonly used  to 
measure income inequality. A Gini coefficient would measure this area and 
thus the total bias. Since we demonstrate that many forms of representation 
exist, it makes no sense to assume proportional representation. Thus, the 
Gini coefficient is an inappropriate measure of bias. 
V1.  ESTIMATING BIAS AND REPRESENTATION 
In  summary, there are two problems with  previous analyses. One is  the 
reliance upon a single year of data. The second is the confusion with  the 
form of representation and bias. Statistics have been calculated for a single 
year, such as in Bandemer or have been  aggregated across time or across 
states (see Taagepera, 1986: 492; Tufte,  1973). Using this model, we  can 
estimate both bias and representation  parameters  for the Indiana House 
and Senate using the seven elections in Table  Our model, technically 
called the "bilogit form," does not constrain the representation coefficient 
to  be  any  particular  value  such  as  1  (proportional)  or  3  (cube  law, 
majoritarian). Nor does it constrain the bias parameter to any particular 
value such as ln(P) =  0 (no bias). It can be used to fully and jointly estimate 
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Table 3. Bias Coefficient Values 
Coefficient Value  Direction of Bias 
In@) >O <=> 6 >  1  bias toward Democrats 
ln(D)=O<=>  P=  1  unbiased 
ln(B)<O<=>  P<1  bias toward Republicans 
both  bias  and  representation.  Thus,  for  a  set  of  elections and  for  a 
particular state over time, we can assess the form of representation and the 
existence of bias.  These estimated parameters  are shown in Table 4 and 
graphed in Figures 4 and 5. 
The negative signs for bias indicate that the bias favors the Republicans 
and that the House is more biased than  the Senate. The representation 
coefficient shows that the House is much closer to proportional represen- 
tation than the Senate. Generally, when single member districts are used, 
the  larger  the  legislative  body,  the  greater  is  the  tendency  toward 
proportionality.  The Indiana House currently has 100 members elected in 
77 districts. The Indiana Senate elects 25 of its 50 members every two years. 
Consequently,  the  Senate  representation  coefficient  is  higher.  This  is 
reflected  in  a  line  that  is  much  steeper.  The  estimation  of  these  two 
parameters permits us to plot the seats-votes  relationship for the period 
1972 to  1984. The limited number  of  years available for estimation of 
Figure 4.  Indiana House of Representatives (p  =  2.05, In  (P) = -  .25) 1972-1984 
Proportion  Democratic  Votes 3 18  LA W & POLICY  July 1987 
Proportion Democratic  Votes 
Table 4.  Indiana State House,  1972-1 984 
Bias and Representation Parameter Estimates 
- 
House  Senate 
Bias  -  0.25  -0.11 
(0.52)  (0.28) 
Representation  2.05  3.26 
(2.55)  (1.77) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
reapportionment  effecls results in  larger standard  errors than  we  would 
prefer.'  Nonetheless, the coefficients indicate the existence of bias and the 
form of representation. 
In order to show the effect of bias, we  also plot the line using the same 
form of representation and no bias. What this shows is that for the Indiana 
House over the period 1972 to 1984, bias is the maximum of 6.2% for the 
House experienced at 50% of the votes. If  the Democrats win 50% of the 
votes, they win only 43% of the seats. In order for the Democrats to win a 
legislative majority, they need to win 53% of the votes. Republicans could 
win  a majority with 47% of the votes. The maximum bias estimated for 
Senate during this time period is 2.8% for the Senate. This curve and the set 
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of points it represents can demonstrate the effects of bias for the form of 
representation  observed  in  the  Indiana  House  and  Senate.  This  is  an 
important result that illustrates the utility of the King-Browning model and 
its application to redistricting analysis. 
V11.  CONCLUSION 
We have discussed the limitations of the seats-vote  measure as relied upon 
in  the  Supreme  Court's  first  decision  holding  that  politically  gerry- 
mandering is a justiciable issue. We agree with the majority in Bandemer 
that "Relying on a single election to prove unconstitutional discrimination is 
unsatisfactory"  (106 S.Ct.  at 2812).  The need  for additional data points 
limits  the  use  of  seats-votes  relationships  as  indicators  of  political 
discrimination in gerrymandering cases. 
The indicator cannot show whether a particular plan is discriminatory or 
if  the election immediately following reapportionment is unfair.  It can be 
used to show whether a state has a history of discrimination. 
We also illustrate here that a redistricting plan may be fair without being 
proportional. The courts have noted this, but have not explicated what a 
fair, nonproportional representation system might look like. We develop a 
more  complete  exposition  of  the  possible  variation  in  the  forms  of 
representation and bias that are experienced in the United States. 
We present evidence from a model that permits the estimation of bias and 
representation  jointly  for a particular  state over a period of  time. Using 
data for the Indiana  House and Senate for  1972 to 1984, the estimated 
parameters show the existence of bias toward the Republicans in the House, 
but that very little bias exists in the Senate. They also show that the form of 
representation in the House is more majoritarian than in the Senate. Bias 
and representation must be considered together. Because of the variation in 
representation type from state to state, what may appear fair in one state 
would be bias in another state. 
Previous  social  science analyses  have  marshalled  too  little  data  and 
constructed much too restricted models to provide the courts an adequate 
means of assessing fairness. We would prefer more data whenever possible. 
The change in district boundaries following reapportionment may affect the 
seats-votes  relationship. Thus, for some states, using data beyond a ten 
year period may be problematic. However, based on numerous empirical 
applications of this model, we  recommend that for most states a decade or 
more of elections are necessary to estimate the parameters for a particular 
state. 
We expect that the result of the Bandemer decision will be the filing of 
more cases alleging political discrimination.  As Justice Stevens argued in 
Karcher v.  Daggett (103 S.Ct. 2653 (1983)), and Justice Powell in Bandemer 
(106 S.Ct. at 2832-2834),  the courts should examine the legislative process 
that generated the plan, the shapes of the districts and the extent to which 320  LA W & POLICY  July I987 
they  respect  existing political  subdivisions,  and the extent to which  the 
mapmakers  were  motivated  only  by  partisan  interests.  The model  we 
present and the analysis of the statistical data for Indiana should not be 
viewed  as a single indicator  of political  discrimination,  but ought to be 
interpreted by the courts as part of the totality of evidence needed to prove 
unconstitutional  gerrymandering.  As Justice  Powell  wrote in  Bandemer 
(106 S.Ct. at 2826): "Because the plurality ignores such factors and fails to 
enunciate standards by which to  determine whether a legislature has enacted 
an unconstitutional  gerrymandering,  I dissent."  Future research, such as 
ours explicating the theoretical and empirical forms of fair representation, 
can help establish these standards. 
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NOTES 
1.  Both the district court decision and the Supreme Court decision will be referred to 
as the Bandemer case. 
2.  The  Bandemer  case  was  brought  by  Indiana  Democrats  challenging  the 
redistricting of the Indiana Statehouse by the majority Republicans following the 
1980 census and prior to the 1982 election. On December 13,  1984 the district 
court ruled 2-1  in favor of the Democrats (see 603 F.  Supp.  1479 (S.D.  Ind. 
1984)). The Republicans appealed to the Supreme Court which ruled in favor of 
the Republicans June 30, 1986 (David v. Bandemer, 106 S.Ct. 2797 (1986)). Con- 
solidated with  the district court case was another lawsuit filed by  the Indiana 
NAACP  charging  unconstitutional  dilution  of  minority  voting  strength.  The 
district  court  rejected  this  claim  noting  "the  voting  efficacy of  the  NAACP 
plaintiffs was impinged upon because of their politics and not  because of their 
race."  603 F. Supp., at 1489-1490. 
3.  The auditor was the only Democratic candidate to win a statewide contest with 
51.1%  of the vote. The Democratic vote for clerk was 49.2%.  Averaging these 
two races evens out advantages which these individual candidates experienced in 
their home counties. It is also close to the Democratic statewide vote for secretary 
of state (48.1 %). 
4.  In  the normal vote  analysis,  we  presume  "winner-take-all"  for House multi- 
member districts. That is, the party with the "normal"  vote majority wins all of 
the seats in the district. In 1982, four of the nine double member districts elected 
representatives of both parties. Six of the seven triple member districts elected all 
Republicans; one elected all Democrats. The Indiana Senate contains only single 
member districts. 
5.  It is also important to retain  comparability  across observations.  For example, 
aggregating data across states appears to make little sense. Reapportionment is 
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conducted  separately by  each state legislature. The number of  representatives 
allocated  to  a  state,  the  degree  of  party  competition  within  the  state,  the 
geographical distribution of votes within the state, the number of uncontested 
seats, and the number of incumbents can all influence the seat-votes  ratio within 
a state. Combining states can only confound the analysis. 
6.  These seven elections encompass two reapportionment decades. This grouping 
is  necessary into order to obtain  a  sufficient  number  of  data points  for the 
estimation of blas and representation. Since the 1970 and 1980 reapportionments 
in  Indiana were conducted by  Republican majorities,  the assumption that the 
plans  were  generated  by  similar  underlying  processes  is  a  reasonable  one. 
Extending  the  period  to include  the  reapportionments  of  the  1960s  would 
compromise  this  assumption because of  changing  nature of  redistricting and 
party margins between 1963 and 1970 (see Hardy et al.,  1981). 
7.  In an estimation for U.S. Congressional elections reported in King and Browning 
(1987) where eighteen elections are used rather than the seven used here, much 
smaller standard errors are obtained in many of the states. An additional, second 
stage analysis in that paper also helps to  demonstrate the validity of our estimates. 
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An Enforcement Taxonomy of 
Regulatory Agencies 
JOHN BRAITHWAITE, JOHN WALKER and PETER GRABOSKY* 
A  variety of  multivariate techniques were  used  to develop a taxonomy of 
regulatory  agencies from  the first  comprehensive study  of  the dkparate 
enforcement  strategies  employed  by  business  regulatory  agencies  in  one 
country.  Seven  types of  agencies  were  identified: Conciliators, Benign Big 
Guns,  Diagnostic  Znspectorates,  Detached  Token  Enforcers,  Detached 
Modest En  forcers,  Token En  forcers  and Modest En  forcers.  Agencies were 
distinguished primarily according to their orientation to enforcement versus 
persuasion, according to their commitment to detached (or arms length) com- 
mand and control regulation versus cooperative  fostering  of self-regulation, 
and according to their attachment to universalistic rulebook regulation versus 
particularistic  regulation.  Nevertheless,  it  is  not  unreasonable  to  view 
regulatory agencies as lying on a single continuum from particularistic non- 
enforcers who engage in cooperative  fostering  of self-regulation to rulebook 
enforcers whose policy is detached command and control. Thk approximates 
the suggestions of Hawkins and Reiss for  distinguishing regulatory agencies 
according to  a 'kanctioning/deterrence" versus "compliance" dimension. The 
predominant  regulatory style in Australia,  however,  is distant from  both 
poles,  being a perfunctory regulatory approach which is neither distinctively 
diagnostic  and  educative  nor  litigiously  "going by the  book";  rather  it 
amounts  to  "going  through  the  motions".  The  typology  ako partially 
conforms to Black's  categorisation of social  control as penal,  therapeutic, 
conciliatory and compensatory. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Despite  the  growing  interest  in  institutions  and  processes  of  business 
regulation throughout the western world, there has yet to be a systematic, 
empirically based typology of regulatory agencies. 
Thus far, most efforts to characterise regulatory agencies have tended to 
emphasise the  specification  of  ideal  types.  These lie  at either end  of  a 
continuum  of  formality  suggested by  the  more  general work  of  Black 
(1976). The more formal style of regulation, for which Reiss (1984) uses the 
term  "deterrence"  and Hawkins  (1984)  the term  "sanctioning",  is based 
essentially upon a penal response  to a regulatory  violation.  The general 
concern  is  the application  of  punishment for corporate misconduct, for 
retributive and deterrent purposes. A harmful or potentially harmful act in 
*We wish  to thank  Debra  Rickwood. Yvonne Pittelkow, Terry Speed, Frank  Jones. Bruce 
Biddle and Jonathan Kelley for assistance and helpful suggestions on the analyses in this paper. 
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